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litigation is not to find the most expeditious method of deciding a private
controversy which the court alone has power to decide, but rather to select
procedural rules which will do most to preserve a statesmanlike balance be-
tween the three co-ordinate departments of American government; to avoid
encroachment which would nullify the powers of one or the other, or ex-
cessive friction which would threaten the entire machinery. Easy, simple
access to the courts in private litigation is a matter of economy, convenience
and justice in judicial administration. Access to the courts in constitutional
litigation is a matter of politics in its higher sense, and in their view ease
and speed may be the surest way of destroying the very institution of judicial
review.
At least in the absence of such direct limitations on the scope of judicial
review as might be interposed by statute7" or constitutional amendment, a
discreet use of empty formulae like the idea of irreparable injury can ma-
terially support a policy of judicial self-restraint.
OPTIONS AND SALE CONTRACTS IN TAXATION
PRoPERTY is not always transferred instantaneously. Rather, the rights,
powers, privileges, etc., constituting the "property" are often transferred in
groups passing at successive stages in the transaction. For example, A may
give Bran option to purchase certain property, thus conferring on B the
power to create in A the duty to convey the property. If B then exercises
his option, a contract of sale is made which is said to give B equitable title
with its legal implications. Finally, legal title and any remaining rights,
privileges, etc., may pass at some still later date. During this period of trans-
fer there is, in a sense, a- split in ownership. Yet tax statutes are generally
written in terms of the simple property concepts of individual ownership
and instantaneous acquisition. Difficulties are therefore inevitable in deter-
mining how these simple terms should be interpreted when applied to prop-
erty in the process of transfer. The problems are primarily of two types, the
first concerning death taxes, and the second, income taxes.
DEATH TAxEs
When property is in the process of transfer from the decedent at the time
of his death, two types of difficulties may arise: that of determining whether
the decedent's interest is within the taxing jurisdiction and that of deter-
mining the value of the taxable estate.
70. See Haines, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitu-
tional Reform (1936) 45 YM'L L. J. 816; Lewinson, Limiting Judicial Rcvicw by Act
of Congress (1935) 23" CALTF. L. REv. 591; Comment (1936) 4 Gno. WAsH. L.
Rav. 381.
[Vol. 46:272272
1936] TAXING OPTIONS AND SALES CONTRACTS 273
Jurisdiction: When a rian dies, his tangible property is subject to death
taxes by the state in which it is located,' but his intangible property is taxable
only by the domiciliary state of the decedent.2 Land is admittedly tangible
property. But where land is subject to a sale contract, the vendor's interest
is generally considered in property law as intangible personalty under the so-
called doctrine of equitable conversion. 3 Accordingly, when a decedent owned
foreign land subject to a sale contract at the time of his death, the problem
has frequently arisen as to whether his interest was tangible, and hence tax-
able at the situs of the realty, or intangible, and therefore taxable by the
domiciliary state. Several states have utilized the equitable conversion con-
cept and held that the land is to be treated as intangible personalty 4 But a
minority of states consider the land as realty, and hence taxable only at the
situs, on the ground that conversion is a fiction in the law of real property
which should not be used to confuse taxation.3 Ifb as a consequence of this
split, the state of situs of the realty and the itate of domicile of the decedent
have different rules, the same property may be taxed twice, or not at all.0
1. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
2. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930)..
3. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 Cor.LL R.v. 369; Simpzon,
Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Coirversion by Contract (1935) 44 YAr=
L. J. 559, 754.
4. Either the domiciliary state claims conversion so as to tax land at the domicile,
State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 145 Min. 155, 176 N. IV.
493 (1920), or the estate can claim conversion so as to defeat a tax by the state of
situs, In. re Boshart's Estate, 107 Misc. 697, 177 N.Y. Supp. 567 (Surr. Ct 1919),
aff'd, 188 App. Div. 788, 177 N.Y. Supp. 574 (4th Dep't, 1919); In re Eilermann's
. Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P. (2d) 763 (1934).
No cases have been discovered involving the taxation of a decedent vendees interest
in foreign land. Logically, those states iich consider the vendor's interest as converted
into personalty should treat the vendee's interest as realty. Cf. Bartlett v. Gill, 221
Fed. 476 (D. Mass. 1915). In that event, only the state where the land is situated
could tax. The question might then arise as to whether the purchase price should be
a deductible debt at the domicile. However, such a deduction would not seem proper
by analogy to the denial of the deductibility of a mortgage debt on foreign land.
U. S. Treas. Reg., 362 C. C. H. (1936) Fed. Tax Serv. 1J2075; see State ex rel.
Hilton v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 145 Minn. 155, 158, 176 N. IV. 493, 494
(1920). If the vendee's interest is considered to be personalty, it should be taxed like
any other contract right. The scarcity of cases on this point may be partly due to
the fact that taxation of the vendee's interest by the state of situs on the theory of
conversion would be impractical, since the state would have no sure method of dis-
covering the death of a prospective purchaser.
5. I1 re Baker's Estate, 67 Misc. 360, 124 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Surf. Ct. 1910); In re
Wolcott's Estate, 94 Misc. 73, 157 N. Y. Supp. 26S (Surr. Ct. 1916); In re Paul's
Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931); cert. denied, 284 U.S. 630 (1931), (1931)
41 YA E L. J. 140.
6. In State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 145 Minn. 155,
176 N.W. 493 (1920), the court, in permitting Minnesota to tax, considered it imma-
terial that Montana had already taxed the property.
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Either result would be unfair, and double taxation might even be considered
unconstitutional, in view of the recent Supreme Court cases forbidding that
practice.7 A simple adjustment of the difficulty could be achieved by the
unanimous adoption of one rule or the other, the choice being relatively
unimportant, but such a solution would encounter the barrier of established
and conflicting authority. A more practical method would seem to be for
both states in each case to use the rule of the jurisdiction in which the land
is situated. This conflicts rule has been applied in a few tax cases involving
equitable conversion by will or under the terms of a trust,s and it is gen-
erally used in cases concerning the devolution of property where the domi-
ciliary state and the state of situs disagree on whether an interest in land is
realty or personalty.0 If this rule were adopted, one and only one state
could tax regardless of the conflict between the states as to which rule is
correct.
Valuation: The chief difficulty in the valuation of a decedent's property
which is subject to an option or a sale contract lies in the fact that valuation
must be based solely on factors existing at the time of death, 0 whereas the
final transfer under the contract takes place, if ever, at some later date. The
value of the property at the .time of death is concededly limited to some
extent by the restrictive effect of such a contract. Litigation develops when
the decedent's estate claims that the contract is not merely a factor in valua-
tion, but rather a conclusive ground for limiting valuation to the contract
price.
The simplest situation arises when property of the decedent is subject to
an executory sale contract. In such a case it seems to have been assumed
that the decedent's interest may not be valued above the sale price."1 A
similar problem is. presented when property is subject to an irrevocable
option. The optionee can then create in the estate a duty to transfer the
property even though the estate can not compel him to purchase. Hence,
under normal business conditions the value of the property to the estate
will rarely exceed the option price, for if the property is worth more, the
optionee will usually exercise -his option; and the estate will be allowed to
7. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930) ; First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
8. Bates v. Decree of Judge of Probate, 131 Me. 176, 160 Atl. 22 (1932); Land
Title and Trust Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189 (1925).
9. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (190); In re Berchtold, [1923] 1, Ch. 192;
Re Burke, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 318 (Saskatchewan)'; see RESTATEmENT, CoNFLicr or
LAWS (1934). §§ 208, 209, 244. But see (1928) 41 HAv. L. Rsv. 795.
10. Hooper v. Bradford, 178 Mass. 95, 59 N.E. 678 (1901) ; In re Penfold's Estate,
216 N.Y. 163, 110 N.E. 497 (1915). Under the 1935 Revenue Act, the executor may
elect to value the estate as of one year after the date of death. 49 STAT. 1022, 26 U. S.
C.A. §411(j) (Supp. 1935).
11. Valuation depends primarily upon the value of the purchaser's promise to pay,
the property entering only as additional security. Hiram S. Norton et al., 16 B. T. A,
1115 (1929).
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retain the property only if it is worth less than the option price. There is
therefore sound practical justification for holding that where property is
at death subject to an option, the property may not be valued above the
option price. But the option may not be exercised even though the prop-
erty is admittedly worth more than the option price. That situation was pre-
sented in Wilson v. Bowers, ' where it was held that since valuation must
be based solely on factors existing at the time of death, the subsequent
failure to exercise the option is immaterial, and valuation cannot exceed
the option price.13
A slightly different problem is presented when the contract gives the
purchaser merely a so-called prior refusal. Thus the stockholders of a
corporation frequently agree that no one of them may sell his stock without
first offering it to the others at a price fixed, or to be determined in a certain
manner.' 4 Such an agreement generally is not w6rded to prevent the bequest
of the stock.'5 Suppose then that a stockholder dies, leaving the stock to X.
Suppose further that the agreed price is $100 a share, but that the stock has
been paying annual dividends of $25 a share. Although the stock cannot
be sold for more than $100 a share, it was probably worth far more than
that to the decedent, and will be worth more to X, because of the dividend
rate. Hence in several Board of Tax Appeals cases the government was,
under such circumstances, allowed to value stock above the agreed price,
although the restriction was recognized as a factor lowering the value of the
stock.' However, in a recent circuit court of appeals case it was held that
since the stock could not be sold for more than the agreed price, it could
not be valued at more.' 7 Yet it seems erroneous thus to treat selling price
as conclusive when, in fact, a duty to sell cannot be imposed.
12. 57 F. (2d) 682 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aff'g 51 F. (2d) 261 (S. D. N.Y. 1931).
13. The opposite result had been reached in an earlier Board of Tax Appeals case,
U. L. Kaufman, 5 B.T.A. 31 (1926), which ras, however, not mentioned in the
Wilson case.
14. As for the validity of such a contract, see Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F. (2d) 166
(C. C.A. 2d, 1936); Scruggs v. Cotterill, 67 App. Div. S3, 73 N.Y. Supp. 032 (1st
Dep't 1902).
15. If the agreement prevented the bequest of the stock, it would seem that since
the estate could be compelled to sell the stock, the restriction would be as effective
as an outright option to purchase at death, and therefore analogous to Wilson v.
Bowers, supra note 12. However, this problem does not seem to have been squarely
raised as yet Cf. Lomb v. Sugden, 11 F. Supp. 472 (W.D. N.Y. 1935), reed, S2 F.
(2d) 166 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936); The Attorney General v. Jameson, [1905] 2 L R. 218;
Waldemar R. Helmholz, Ex'r, 28 B.T.A. 165 (1933) semble.
16. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 23 B.T.A. 663 (1931); The Michigan Trust
Co., 27 B.T.A. 556 (1933); Frederick A. Koch, Jr., 28 B.T.A. 363 (1933); Estate
of Louise N. Schulz, 14 B. T.A. 419 (1928) cmble.
17. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F. (2d) 166 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936), rcV'g 11 F. Supp. 472
(W. D.N.Y. 1935). For a similar English case, see It ro Paulin, Deceased, [1934]
W. N. 173, criticized in 178 L. T. 83 (1934). Contra: The Attorney General v. Jameson,
[1905] 2 LR. 218; Smyth v. Revenue Commissioners, [1931] LIL 643.
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While the foregoing rules of valuation are necessary to prevent over-
valuation of the decedents interest, they would, if unsupplemented, open the
door to evasion. For example, suppose a testator wishes to bequeath certain
property to A. The testator can achieve almost the same result by giving A
an option to purchase the property after the testator's death for a nominal
sum, or by making a sale contract with A on similar terms, and under the
foregoing rules of valuation, the decedent's interest at the time of death
could not be valued above the nominal agreed price. Hence, in order to
round out the scheme of death taxation, it was found necessary to include
in the gross taxable estate not only the decedent's interest in the property,
but also, in certain cases, the purchaser's. This was achieved under the
statutory provisions which include in the taxable estate transfers, to take
effect at or after death.18 The interpretation of -these provisions can prob-
ably best be understood by an historical survey of the experience under the
New York statute. 19
The original New York statute2 ° provided for the taxation of all transfers
taking effect at or after death. This broad provision threatened to include
contracts performed after death resulting from bona fide business transac-
tions. It was therefore held at an early date that the statute did not include
transfers for consideration. 2' But then a case arose in which two brothers
made mutual promises that the survivor should have an option to purchase
certain of the decedent's stock for $60 a share. Clearly the estate of the
first to die was taxable for the stock at $60 a share. However, the stock
was actually worth far more, and the state therefore tried to tax as a transfer
to take effect at or after death the difference between the actual value and
the $60 a share already included in the taxable estate. The tax was allowed, 22
18. The present federal statute which is typical of these provisions reads: "The
value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value
at the time of his death of all property ...
(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death;
(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has . . . made a
transfer . . . intended to take effect . . . at or after his death . . . except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money 'or money's worth."
44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U.S.C. §411 (1934).
19. For a thorough analysis of this development, see Matter of Howell, 255 N. Y.
211, 174 N.E. 457 .(1931).
20. N. Y. Laws of 1896, Ch. 908, §220(3), as amended by Laws of 1897, Ch. 284.
21. Matter of Miller, 77 App. Div. 473, 78 N.Y. Supp. 930 (2d Dep't 1902);
Matter of Baker, 83 App. Div. 530, 82 N.Y. Supp. 390 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd without
opinion, 178 N.Y. 575, 70 N.E. 1094 (1904).
22. Matter of Cory, 177 App. Div. 871, 164 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dep't 1917),
aff'd without opinion, 221 N.Y. 612, 117 N.E. 1065 (1917). The transfer is included
in the taxable estate only to the amount of the difference between market value and
$60 a share because $60 a share is already included as the value of the decedent's
interest. The present federal and New York statutes [44 STAT. 71-72 (1926), 26
U. S. C. § 411 (i) (1934); N.Y. TAx LAw (1930) § 249r (11)3 specifically provide
that such transfers are taxable only as to the difference between market value and
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and the rule developed that whereas transfers for consideration are generally
exempt, this exemption does not apply where the transfer is primarily dona-
tive and testamentary in nature.P This test is now generally used in other
courts also,24 but it has caused frequent litigation as to when a transfer for
consideration is primarily donative. In analyzing the cases, it should be
noticed that the term donative may have two meanings. It may refer to the
intent of the decedent to make a gift, in which case the issue should hinge
on his intent at the -time the contract was made. On the other hand, "donative"
may mean the actual giving of something, and the issue should then depend
upon whether the agreed- price is as high as the market value of the property
at the time of death. Since the purpose of the statute is not to tax business
transactions in which the transferor got a bargain, but rather transfers of a
testamentary nature, it would seem that "donative' should be held to refer
to intent.-' But this definition can hardly be kept clear-cut, for a large dis-
crepancy between market value and the agreed price at the time of death
may be treated as evidence that the decedent intended to make a gift when
he entered into -the contract. And the definition becomes particularly difficult
to apply in the following type of situation when the motives for the transac-
tion may be beneficent, commercial, or both.
If the members of a small firm.desire to continue their business after the
death of any of their number, they are likely to encounter serious difficulties. -
For if the firm is incorporated, the stock of the decedent passes to his estate,
and the remaining stockholders may have difficulty in purchasing the stock
the value of the consideration given. It is interesting to note, however, that for this
purpose a promise in an aleatory contract which need not be performed is not treated
as consideration. See In re Huggins Estate, 96 N. J. Eq. 275, 282, 125 At. 27, 29
(Prerog. Ct. 1924).
23. In re Orvis' Estate, 223 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E. 88 (1918), afi'g 179 App. Div. 1,
166 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1917). But cf. In re Fieux.'s Estate, 241 N.Y. 277,
149 N.E. 857 (1925) (here the stockholders of a small corporation agreed that if any
one of them retired from the firm or died, the others were to buy his stock. The
agreement was held not primarily testamentary). The New York statute [N.Y. TAX
LAw (1930) §249r(3)] has since been amended to conform with the federal statute,
see mtpra note 18, but this would seem to be intended as merely declaratory of the
prior law.
24. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Tait, 295 Fed. 429 (D. Md. 1923); Phillips v.
Gnichtel, 27 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); In re Huggins Estate, 96 N. 3. Eq.
275, 125 AtL 27 (Prerog. Ct. 1924); cf. Will of Jones, 206 Wis. 482, 240 N.W. 106
(1932). But cf. Rose Newman, 31 B. T. A. 772 (1934); Davidson v. Rafferty, 34 F.
(2d) 700 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
25. No case has been found in which a transfer pursuant to an admittedly business
transaction was taxed simply because the purchaser drove a good bargain, but under
the present wording of the federal and New York statutes [43 S=a. 304 (1924), 26
U.S.C. §411 (1934); N. Y. TAX LAw (1930) §249r(3)] taing all transfers
taking effect at death unless by a bona fide sale for fair and adequate consideration,
it could be argued that even if there was no donative intent, if the purchaser gave so
little consideration as to be inadequate, the transfer might be taxable.
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from the estate. On the other hand, if the firm is a partnership, it is auto-
matically dissolved on the death of any member, and the estate of the deced-
ent is entitled to the value of the decedents share in the partnership. But
frequently the valuation of this interest causes a dispute that requires the
time and expense of judicial settlement. To avoid these difficulties, the mem-
bers of such firms often agree that -the interest of any decedent shall be
purchased by the survivors at a figure to be calculated according to some
agreed method of valuation. Under the rules of valuation previously con-
sidered, such an agreement limits the taxable value of the decedent's interest
to the contract price. However, the members of a small firm may wish to
leave something at death to their business associates. Therefore, in making
such an agreement, they may select a method of valuation resulting in an
at least conservatively low estimate of the firm's worth. For example, they
frequently agree to take book value without any addition for good will.
Hence when the valuation under such an agreement seems distinctly low,
the tax officials may assert that the transfer is donative, and thus taxable
on the difference between its actual worth, as found by a court, and the
valuation under the agreement. The mere fact that at the time of death
the tax officials disagree with the firm's valuation should not be sufficient
grounds for taxation, since the justification for such a tax lies in the exist-
ence of a donative intent. But since positive proof of the parties' intent
is usually lacking, the state courts seem to have accepted evidence to show
that the agreed method of valuation is not the usual one. Thus, where the
method of valuation is book value without addition for good will, the state
cases hold that good will may be valued and taxed.20 Yet since good will is
highly speculative, and since in the case of some firms it may be practically
valueless, an agreement not to value good will does not seem donative per se.27
It would seem preferable not tb lay down general rules, but rather to deter-
mine in each case whether the agreed method of valuation can be justified
as realistic.
On the whole, the rules for taxing estates containing property subject to
an option or executory contract are reasonably consistent and simple. With
a few exceptions, the estate has been protected from taxation above the
actual value to the beneficiaries of the property involved, and the possibili-
ties of evasion have been to a large extent eliminated by the rule that when
26. it re Hall's Estate, 94 N. 3. Eq. 398, 119 At. 669 (Prerog. Ct. 1923); Ini re
Deutz's Estate, 105 N. .. Eq. 671, 149 At. 257 (Prerog. Ct. 1930) ; In re Burgheirner's
Estate, 91 Misc. 468, 154 N. Y. Supp. 943 (Surr. Ct. 1915); in re Cohen's Estate,
170 N. Y. Supp. 156 (Surr. Ct. 1918); In re Halle's Estate, 103 Misc. 661, 170 N.Y.
Supp. 898 (Surr. Ct. 1918); h; re Hellman's Estate, 172 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Surr. Ct.
1918), aff'd, 174 N.Y. Supp. 905, aff'd, 226 N.Y. 702, 123 N.E. 869 (1919). Contra:
In re Borden's Estate, 95 Misc. 443, 159 N. Y. Supp. 346 (Surr. Ct. 1916) (seemingly
overruled by the New York cases, supra) ; William P. Blodget, 18 B. T. A. 1050 (1930).
27. Possibly the Board of Tax Appeals is aiming towards such a rule. Cf. Willlam'
P. Blodget, 18 B. T.A. 1050 (1930).
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a contract is not part of a bona fide business transaction, the government
may tax the property at its full value by taxing the decedent's interest at
the contract price, and by taxing as a transfer to take effect at death the
difference between the actual value of the property and the contract price.
Yet Wilson v. Bowers seems to have left one loophole requiring considera-
tion. Suppose A gives B an option to purchase certain stock for $10,000,
the option to be exercised within one month after A"s death. When A dies,
according to Wilson v. Bowers, the stock may not be valued at above $10,000,
even if the option is not later exercised. Now suppose that the stock is
worth $100,000, and that the contract is admittedly donative. If B exercises
the option there will be a tax on $90,000 as a transfer to take effect at death,
and the whole $100,000 will thus be taxed. But if B fails to exercise the
option, there would seem to be no basis for any estate tax other than on the
original $10,000. Hence if Wilson v. Bowers is followed, an easy method of
evasion is available, for A could readily assure himself that the option would
not be exercised by giving it to the legatee of the property under the will.
IxcomE TAXES
In the death tax cases hitherto discussed, a fixed moment in the process of
transfer was taken, the moment of death, and the difficulty lay in determin-
ing the status and value of the decedents interest as of that point. In the
income tax cases there arises the converse problem of determining the par-
ticular moment at which the transfer may be said to take place. This problem
has two aspects, that of determining the moment at which the seller "parts"
with the property, and that of selecting the moment at which the buyer
"acquires" the property. Although these are only different sides of the same
picture, there seems no logical necessity for using in all cases the same cri-
teria for selecting the moment of transfer, since the concept of a single
moment of transfer is so obviously a fiction. The problem may be subdivided
according to the practical issues involved. First, it is necessary to select a
point at which the transfer may be considered to have occurred, in order to
decide the year in which the seller has realized his profit or loss. In the sec-
ond place, an arbitrary choice must sometimes be made as to the moment at
which the seller will be considered to have acquired the property originally,
in order to decide which of several statutory provisions is applicable. And
finally, both a moment of sale and an original moment of acquisition must
be selected in order to ascertain how long the vendor has held the property,
a fact which becomes relevant under the capital gains provision.
In What Year Is Income Realized? Income taxes are collected annually.
Hence when a taxpayer sells property at a gain or loss, it becomes necessary
to fix a year within which he may be said to realize that gain or loss. The
practical factors to be considered in selecting this point are, first, that the
vendor should not be compelled to pay a tax on his profit until there is a rea-
sonable certainty that it will actually be realized, and second, the govern-
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ment should be permitted to tax income as soon as possible in the interests
of the public purse. The rule of the courts is often said to be that income
is realized at the first moment at which there is created an "enforceable
liability" for the purchase price,28 perhaps more accurately described as a
"right" to the purchase price. An attempt will be made to determine the
extent to which the decided cases can be thus easily classified.
Since the dominant characteristic of an option is that the optionee is not
bound to purchase, under this rule, a prospective seller would appear to
have realized no profit while his property is subject only to an option con-
tract. But alfhough the optionee may be under no legal compulsion, as a
practical matter he may be forced to purchase. Thus in one case, where a
four year lease with an option to purchase set an annual rental of roughly
one-fourth the value of the property, and an option price of $1, it was
held that since, as a practical matter, the optionee had no choice but to buy,
the contract, although in form an option, should be treated as a sale.20 But
where there is an actual chance that the optionee may not buy, the courts
will postpone taxation even though the chance is slight8 0
Once an option has been exercised, or a contract of sale made, theoretically
the vendor has a right to the purchase price, and his profit would be taxable
at that point if the courts applied the test that income is realized when the
vendor acquires a right to collect the purchase price. Yet if a sale contract
provides that the purchaser may rescind and pay liquidated damages, the
contract is fairly similar to an option.8 1 Hence the profit is not generally
considered taxable until there has been further performance. 2 Similarly,
where a contract is .largely executory, even though the purchaser is tech-
nically bound, there often remains a fair possibility that -the contract will
never be performed, or will be performed under altered terms. Therefore
the courts have frequently postponed taxation until there has been sufficient
performance to create a reasonable practical certainty that the contract will
be carried out as agreed.33 Thus in the leading case of Lucas v. North Texas
Lumber Company,34 where the vendor gave an option on December 27, 1916,
28. Ohio Brass Co., 17 B. T. A. 1199, 1203 (1929). For further discussion and
additional cases, see I PAU. AND MERTENs, FEDEPAL INCOME TAxAxoN (1934) 11.47.
Although reference to an enforceable liability suggests consideration of the remedy
available to the vendor, the courts have not distinguished between cases in which the
vendor could get the full purchase price and those in which he could get only damages.
29. A. B. Watson, 24 B. T. A. 466 (1931), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 35 (C. C.A. 9th, 1932);
cf. I. T. 1819, 11-2 Cum. Bull. 73.
30. Arthur J. Coyle, 17 B. T.A. 368 (1929); cf. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.
(2d) 14 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); John T. Morris, 15 B.T.A. 260 (1929); The Grand
Rapids Trust Co., 34 B.T.A., March 20, 1936.
31. Sheeby. v. Scott, 128 Iowa 551, 104 N. W. 1139 (1905).
32. Parish-Watson & Co., Inc., 4 B. T. A. 605 (1926) ; Friend M. Aiken, 10 B. T. A.
553 (1928); Higgins Estate, 30 B.T. A. 814 (1934).
33. Newaygo Portland Cement Co., 27 B. T. A. 1097 (1933); Falls City Ice and
Beverage Co., 27 B.T.A. 1346 (1933).
34. 281 U. S. 11 (1930), rev'g 30 F. (2d) 680 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929).
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which was exercised on December 30, 1916, the actual conveyance, how-
ever, not taking place until January 5, 1917, the United States Supreme
Court held that the vendor had not realized his profit until 1917.as
Considering these cases as a whole, it becomes clear that the "enforceable
liability" test, while conceptually convenient, is not strictly adhered to; it has
been necessary to make a practical compromise with the rule, and look to
the actual rather than the legal effect of a contract. No general rule seems
strong enough to support assured prediction, but the important factors which
tend to be decisive in any individual case seem to be (1) the moment at
which the purchaser gets possession," or if an intangible is involved, prac-
tical dominion,37 and (2) the amount of the consideration which has already
been paid,38 and the definiteness as to time"0 and amount 0 of the considera-
tion remaining to be paid.
When is Property Acquired? It sometimes becomes necessary to determine
when property was acquired because, in taxing the profit from a sale, differ-
ent statutory provisions may apply, depending upon the date at which the
vendor originally acquired the property. For example, the taxable profit
from a sale is generally calculated by deducting cost from sale price, but
in order to avoid the taxation of gains actually accruing prior to March 1,.
1913, the date of the Income Tax Amendment, it is provided that where
35. The Court attempted to justify its decision by interpreting "enforceable liability"
for the purchase price as "unconditional liability" for the purchase price, and holding
that since the deed was not tendered till 1917, the liability had not become unconditional
until then. Yet a strict adherence to this rule would generally postpone t=tioa until
the vendor had tendered complete performance, which is, for practical ta: purposes,
often far too late in the transfer. Hence the lower courts, while following the North
Texas case on its facts [see Falls City Ice & Beverage Co., 27 B.T.A. 1346 (1933)],
have ignored the attempt to prefix unconditional to "enforceable liability. Union
Pacific R. R. Co., 32 B.T.A. 383 (1935); A. B. Watson, 24 B.T.A. 466 (1931),
aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 35 (C. C.A. 9th, 1932).
36. Newaygo Portland Cement Co., 27 B.T.A. 1097 (1933) (contract for sale of
land made in 1922, with 10% down payment, but vendor retaining possession till
completion of payment in 1923 not taxable until 1923); A. B. Watson, 24 B.T.A. 465
(1931) ; Parish-Watson & Co., Inc., 2 B. T. A. 851 (1925); Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
32 B.T.A. 383 (1935) (contract for sale of land made in 1920, with 257 of payment
in 1920, but remaining payments spread till 1926. Purchaser took possessiog, hence
taxable in 1920); Edwin M. Brown, 1 B.T.A. 502 (1925).
37. Brunton v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 81 (C.C.A. 9Mh, 1930), cert. d~ed,
282 U. S. 889 (1930) (contract for sale of stock, made in 1921, "to be consummated
in 1922," but held tax-able in 1921 because seller gave buyer an irrevocable power of
attorney for the stock).
38. Brunton v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) (payment not
made until 1922, but the fact that the purchaser gave collateral to secure paymnent
deemed a factor justifying taxation in 1921).
39. Teck Hobbs, 26 B.T.A. 241 (1932) (sale of oil lease for VD,000 to be paid
out of oil as produced, held so uncertain as to time of payment as not to h ta.able
immediately).
40. Commissioner v. R. J. Darnell, Inc., 60 F. (2d) 82 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932).
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property was acquired prior to that date, and the market value as of that date
exceeded cost, then this market value shall be used instead of cost in com-
puting the taxable profit.41 The difficulty lies in determining how far the
process of transfer must have progressed by March 1, 1913 in order that
the purchaser may be said to have acquired the property.4 2 In one case where
a sale contract was made prior to 1913, but conveyance and part of the pay-
ment did not take place till later, it was held that the equitable title created
by the contract was sufficient acquisition.4 3 But that anything less could be
considered acquisition would seem doubtful after the recent Supreme Court
decision in Helvering v.. San Joaquin Fruit and Izveslment Company,44 which
held that ownership on March 1, 1913, of a lease to property with an option
to purchase did not constitute acquisition even though the option price was
so far below the value of the property that as a practical matter the optionee
was sure to purchase.45 This decision would seem to indicate that strict con-
veyancers' rules will be used in defining acquisition, rather than the more
flexible tests employed in determining the moment of sale. This distinction
41. 48 STAT. 708 (1934), 26 U. S. C. (1934) § 113 (a) 14. This problem could
also arise under subdivisions 7, 8, and 12 of the above code provision.
42. For related cases arising under this statute, see Heiner v. Hewes, 30 F. (2d)
787 (C. C.A. 3d, 1929) (In 1913, taxpayer was litigating over title to land, and suit
was later settled in his favor. Held, that he had good title throughout, and hence
acquired property prior to 1913); City Bank Company, I B. T. A. 210 (1924) (Tax-
payer bid for property in receivership on February 28, 1913, and bid was accepted
on March 24. Held, that although taxpayer was bQund by offer, vendor was riot, and
there was therefore no acquisition prior to March 24); Commercial Truck Company
of America, 5 B.T.A. 602 (1926); N. G. Behles, 30 B.T.A. 1208 (1934).
43. Arthur B. Grover, 3 B.T.A. 508 (1926).
44. 56 S. Ct. 569 (1936). Followed in Helen E. Leatherbee & State Street Trust
Company, 34 B.T.A., March 24, 1936.
45. Since in the San Joaquin case the option price was $200,000, while the admitted
value of the property was $1,000,000 on March 1, 1913, the use of cost, or $200,000,
in computing profit resulted in taxing $800,000 which was actually attributable to an
increase in the value of the land occurring prior to 1913. The Supreme Court disposed
of the argument that such a retroactive application of the Amendment would be un-
constitutional by stating that while the profit accrued to the land prior to 1913, this
profit could not accrue to the taxpayer until he actually acquired the land, which,
according to the Court, did not take place till the option was exercised in 1916. This
is a somewhat unconvincing distinction, since the-taxpayer by his ownership of the
option was in a position before 1913 to benefit by the increase in value, his option
itself hbaving become worth roughly $800,000 because of the increase in property value.
Belridge Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 364 C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax Serv. 9473 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936). However, in determining whether a tax is unconstitutional as reaching
profit accruing during an exempt period, the courts have tended when possible to
uphold taxation even if on technical grounds. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918)
(Stockholders taxed for dividends received after 1913 out of profits earned before
1913) ; Grace W. Dick, 30 B. T. A. 1304 (1934) (Profit accruing to Indian land while
exempt from property taxation was subject to income taxation where sale occurred
after the exemption was lifted).
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may be functionally justified, for a strict rule is more convenient in cases
involving the arbitrary determination of which of two statutory provisions
shall apply, whereas, for the practical and administrative reasons discussed
above, a more flexible rule is preferable in determining when income is
realized.
How Long Has Property Been Held? Capital gains are profits derived
from the sale of long held assets. Such profits ordinarily accrue over the
whole period of ownership, yet the profit must generally be taken in one
year. Hence a capital gain might throw the taxpayer's income into the higher
surtax brackets. This danger would so seriously discourage the sale of long
held assets that it was found necessary to lessen this burden. The earlier
revenue acts-" provided that in case of profits from the sale of assets other
than stock in trade which had been held for over two years, the taxpayer had
the choice of paying the normal graduafed rate or a flat 12%o rate. Under
the new revenue act,47 capital gains are grouped with normal gains, but
only a certain percentage of the profit is taxable, decreasing according to
the length of time the asset has been held. Further, there are now five clas-
sifications, depending upon the length of holding, with different rates for
each class.48 Hence the problem of determining the exact holding period
will be of increased importance in the future.
The end of the holding period is the moment when income is said to be
realized as determined by the criteria already discussed. 0 In general, the
period is considered to begin at the single point, hitherto defined, when the
property is "acquired". 0 But in some cases, appreciable amounts of money
are invested at widely separated times, either before or after the single
moment of acquisition which would thus be selected. Since one of the pur-
poses of the present act is to make the tax proportional to the length of
time capital has been invested, there is strong practical justification for
dividing the profit into parts which can be attributed to each of these invest-
ments and taxing each part according to the length of time between its
respective investment and the sale. Apportionment of this sort has been
used in analogous cases. Thus, where a taxpayer purchased a lot in 1919,
built a house on it in 1921, and sold both in 1922, it was held that the profit
46. First appearing in §206 of the 1921 Revenue Act, 42 SAT. 232, this provision
was also contained in the 1924, 1926, 1928, and 1932 Revenue Acts. See 26 U.S. C.A.
§ 101 (1934) (historical note).
47. 48 STAT. 714 (1934), 26 U.S. C § 101 (1934). For a discussion of the new
provisions, see Hendricks, Capital Gains and Losses (1935) 49 HAv. L. Rnv. 262.
48. If property has been held less than one year, 100% is ta:xable; one to two years,
80% tax-able; two to five years, 60% ta-mble; five to ten years, 40% ta.'mble; over
ten years, 30% tax-able. 48 STAT. 714 (1934), 26' U.S. C. (1934) § 101(a).
49. W.] H. Hay, 25 B."T. A. 96 (1932); ef. Dahlinger v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d)
662 (C.C.A. 3d, 1931).
50. M. Ernest Greenebaum, Jr., 27 B.T.A. 8S9 (1933); D. C. Bothwell, 27 B.T.A.
1351 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 35 (C. C.A. 10th, 1935); John C Shaffer, 28 B.T.A.
1294 (1933).
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could be subdivided, part being treated as attributable to the land, which had
been held over two years, and was therefore taxable as capital gain, and
part attributable to the house and hence taxable as normal gain. The ques-
tion as to whether -this device of apportionment is to be used in cases involv-
ing the process of transfer has arisen chiefly in. regard to the acquisition
and exercise of stock rights.
Frequently a corporation issues to its stockholders rights to purchase
additional shares of stock at b'elow the market price. Such rights are very
much like stock dividends in that they embody a part of the stockholder's
equity which has hitherto been represented by the original stock. Therefore
in Wood v. Commissioner,52 when a taxpayer who had long owned stock in
a corporation received stock rights in 1927, exercised thein, and sold the new
stock within two years, the circuit court of appeals held that there was a
continuity of investment from the time of acquisition of the original stock
until the sale of the new stock such that the part of the profit attributable to
the original investment which had given rise to the rights should be treated
as capital gain,53 whereas the profit attributable to thp new investment re-
quired to exercise the rights should be treated as normal gain. 4 However,
in Commissioner v. Cummings,5 5 where the taxpayer bought rights on the
open market in 1925, exercised them in 1929, and then sold the resulting
stock in -the same year, no apportionment was permitted, the whole profit
being attributed to the 1929 investment, and -hence taxed as normal gain.
Superficially, these two decisions seem irreconcilable, for if the court will
go behind the moment of the exercise of the right in one case, it would seem
51. Dunigan v. Burnet, 66 F. (2d) 201 (App. D. C. 1933), aff'g 23 B. T. A. 418
(1931); I. T. 2469, VIII-I Cum. Bull. 158.
52. 75 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
53. For another use of this concept of continuity of investment, see E. V. Securities
Corporation, 28 B.T.A. 914 (1933).
54. The question of how the profits should be split up has not yet been settled.
The method used in the Wood case seems erroneous, and was disapproved in the
later case of Macy v. Helvering, 82 F. (2d) 183, 186 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936). However,
in that case the problem of computation was not argued. The simplest method appar-
ently is to split up the profit in the ratio of the cost of the rights and the cost of
their exercise. The cost & the rights can be calculated by finding the percentage of
the cost of the original stock which may properly be attributed to the rights. See
Maggs, Cqmputatiois of Income om Sale of Dividend Stock or Subscription Rights
(1924) 13 CALIF. L. Rrv. 13. Then if "cr" is the cost of the rights, and "cer" is
the cost of their exercise, and C is the total cost or "cr" plus "cer", and P is the
total profit, then the profit attributable to the rights is .M X P, and the profits attri-
C
butable to their exercise is !er X P. This method, although simple, discriminates
C
somewhat against the taxpayer, for it apportions the profit in the ratio of the respective
costs, yet probably a large part of the appreciation took place before the exercise of
the rights, and is entirely attributable to the original cost. Yet any attempt to prevent
this inequality would probably require an unduly complicated formula.
55. 77 F. (2d) 670 (C. CA. 5th, 1935).
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proper to do so in the other. 0 Yet the distinction is justifiable from the
standpoint of policy. The period between the acquisition of such rights
and their exercise is generally fairly short. Hence, where the original invest-
ment is the purchase of rights on the market, the interval between that invest-
ment and the one involved in exercising the rights is usually so short that
apportionment would seldom save the taxpayer enough to warrant the
trouble it would entail. But where the original investment is the purchase
of stock, and the rights are issued considerably later, the interval between
the original investment and that involved in exercising the rights may well
be long enough to make apportionment of substantial value to the taxpayer.
Furthermore, the threat of losing the benefit of the holding period prior to
the acquisition of the rights would discourage stockholddrs from exercising
them, and this would in turn seriously affeck the common corporate practice
of attracting new capital by issuing stock rights.
MISCELLAxEOUS TAXES
Hitherto options have been considered only with reference to their use as
a preliminary stage in the process of transfer. However, option contracts
can be used as devices to give the optionee control over the property subject
to option, with only the incidental purpose of leading to a future transfer.
Where an option is used for this purpose, the contract often leads to an
unusual contractual relationship between the optionor and the optionee,
raising varied and interesting tax problems,5 7 a few of which wiU be sug-
gested.
In Ohio, land is exempt from property taxation if it is both owned and
used by a charitable organization. An individual owning some temporarily
unoccupied land conveyed it to a charitable organization in return for an
option to repurchase the land for $10 at any time after one year. It was
held that the charity's bare legal tite combined with actual use was sufficient
to satisfy the statutory exemption provision, and that the land was therefore
not taxable.i s
56. After the Cummings case was decided, the Board of Tax Appeals refued to
follow the Wood case. May Rogers, 32 B.T.A. 1176 (1935). However, in Macy v.
Helvering, 82 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), the second circuit had facts presented
similar to the Wood case, and permitted apportionment expressly stating that the
Wood and Cummings case -were not inconsistent.
57. For further problems involving options, see Rodriques v. Edwards, 40 F. (2d)
403 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Estate of Erskine AL Ross, 29 B. T. A. 227 (1933); Albert
Russel Ersldne, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932); Helvering v. Salvage, 56 S. Ct. 375 (1936);
Realty Sales Co., 10 B.T.A. 1217 (1928).
58. Zangerle v. State ex rel. Gallagher, 120 Ohio St. 139, 165 N.E. 709 (1929),
(1929) 39 YAm. L I. 137; cf. Mausoleum Builders of N. J. v. State Board of Taxes
& Assessments, 90 N. J. Law 163, 100 AUt. 236 (1917); Morris et al. v. Board of
Commissioners of Love County, 74 Okla. 199, 177 Pac. 900 (1917).
285
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Revenue Act provides that the income of a revocable trust is taxable
to the settlor. A taxpayer, in order to lessen his income taxes, transferred to
an irrevocable trust stock worth $200 a share, taking in return, however, an
option to repurchase any of the stock for $10 a share. The Board of Tax
Appeals held that the settlor here had a power of revocation as to 19/20 of
the trust, and hence was taxable for that percentage of the income accruing
to the stock. 9
The Revenue Act exempts from taxation all income derived from a public
utility and accruing to any political subdivision of a state. A city which
desired to construct a reservoir, but had reached its debt limit, persuaded
certain public spirited citizens to organize a public utility corporation to build
the reservoir. This corporation issued $1,000,000 of stock, but the corporate
charter specifically provided that the stockholders were entitled to cumulative
dividends at a rate limited to 7% a year, that the- stock could be retired at
any time at par, and that after two years,. all profits beyond the dividends
had to be used to retire outstanding stock. The corporation then agreed to
supply the city with water in return for part of the city's water rents, and
further gave the city the option at any time to purchase the reservoir in
return for a sum equal to the par value of the stock still outstanding.
The income of the corporation was held taxable as not accruing to the city
within the meaning of the Act.s0
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
AND THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
THE declaratory, judgment,' a remedy singularly well adapted to con-
troversies arising from the insurance contract, has been invoked with increas-
ing frequency in insurance cases.2 While the insurer simply promises to
pay an amount of money upon the happening of some contingency in the
future, the continued expectation of the policyholder that the insurance
59. Charles T. Fisfier, 28 B. T. A. 1164 (1933).
60. Decatur Water Supply Co., 34 B.T. A., April 9, 1936.
1. Declaratory judgment statutes have been enacted in 39 states and territories.
See Borchard, Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief (1936) 10 TEMP. L. Q.
233, 245. A Federal Declaratory Judgments .Act was adopted in 1934. 48 STAr. 955,
28 U.S.C. § 400 (1934).
2. The declaratory judgment has long been extensively used in insurance cases
abroad. See foreign cases cited in BoRcnARD, DzcLARnAToaR JUDm MENTS (1934) 490-
497, covering the subject of this comment.
The declaration has been resorted to successfully on a large scale in other fields
as well, particularly in patent cases. (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 160; (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1287.
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company intends to perform its obligation is as significant to him as ultimate
recovery after loss. Nor is the insurer desirous of waiting for suit upon a
policy for the adjudication of a controversy rooted in facts which had oc-
curred many years previously. Hence any device is welcomed which will
conclusively dispel uncertainty and insecurity in the generally long period
during which insurance policies purport to be operative.
In the various situations which arise during the life of a policy law and
equity have not failed entirely in furnishing remedies. In some instances
damages, rescission, cancellation, reformation, restitution, interpleader, and
the injunction have been employed; but in others even the most strenuous
display of legal imagination could not make a conventional remedy avail-
able. The declaratory judgment furnishes a technique adequate to meet
these difficulties, obviating much of the procedural hardship associated with
suits or actions for older remedies,3 and providing a remedy for many situa-
tions for the first time.4 So long as the-conditions of justiciability are pres-
ent-interested parties asserting adverse claims in a controversy ripe for
judicial determination 5-the availability of other remedies should not of it-
self bar the granting of the declaration; for there is no reason to compel a
plaintiff to demand a drastic, complicated, and expensive remedy, when a
mild, simple, and inexpensive one, disposing of the issue without disturbing
the relations of the parties, is adequate.0
A survey of the many situations in which declaratory relief has been
invoked indicates the utility of this procedure in the field of insurance. The
remedy has not been confined to any one class of litigant or to any recurring
groove of situations; for insurer, insured, beneficiary, and other interested
parties have employed it with effect to settle a variety of issues. A survey
of these cases will also serve to illustrate how the declaratory judgment is
being digested into the body of the law, and to what extent the declaratory
judgment in action does or can simplify and reform procedure, as its pro-
ponents have urged. The declaratory judgment is a comparatively new
remedy in this country aid as yet is remarkably free from ambiguity and
hocus-pocus. The attitude of the courts toward it will have direct conse-
quences upon its development. Decisions on declaratory relief written in
the spirit of "trial by combat" could soon weave an unfortunate crust of
technicality around the declaratory judgment.
3. See, e.g., p. 288 infra where the availability of the equitable remedy of can-
cellation is discussed.
4. See, e.g., p. 293 infra where is discussed a situation under a disability policy
in which neither law nor equity provides a remedy.
5. BoRcHmn, DcARAToRY Iuntmcx's (1934) 29-50; Legis. (1935) 49 HARv.
L. Rnv. 1351. It will be assumed in the situations described in the remainder of this
comment that conflicting claims have been asserted by the parties out of court.
6. BoRcrA D, op. cit. stpra note 5, at 162. Although reference will be made
throughout this comment to the availability of other remedies, it should not be inferred
that declarations ought to be refused on that account.
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Validity of Policy. Both before and- after loss there may be considerable
doubt as to whether or not a policy is valid. An insurer may wish to have
a policy voided on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation, and until an
adjudication of that issue the insurer can determine neither its responsibility
for the risk nor the necessity of maintaining reserves to offset the contingent
liability. The equitable bill of cancellation might be available in such situa-
tions, but this relief is not always decreed since it is said after a loss has
occurred that the insurer's privilege eventually to defend an action on the
policy provides an adequate legal remedy precluding equitable jurisdiction.1
Only when a loss has not yet occurred8 or when the policy contains an incon-
testable clause9 is that privilege regarded as inadequate. The beneficiary,
however, may delay bringing suit on the policy not only to bring himself
within the protection of an incontestability clause but also to make evidence
less accessible to the insurer.10 Aware of these difficulties, several courts
7. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 (U.S. 1871); Di Giovanni
v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Richmond,
107 Conn. 117, 139 Ati. 702 (1927); ef. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 X. Y.
202 (1879). Contra: Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 96 Mass. 351 (1867);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bellos, 158 Tenn. 554, 13 S.W. (2d) 795 (1929), rehearing
denied, 158 Tenn. 562, 14 S.W. (2d) 961 (1929); see New York Life Ins. 'Co. v.
Steinman, 103 N. J. Eq. 403, 404, 143 Adt. 529 (Ch. 1928).
And in one case where the legal remedy was clearly inadequate the court refused
to decree cancellation. The insurer's defenses to the claim of the insured for disability
payments were fraud in procuring the policy and non-disability. In an action for those
payments a general verdict by a jury for the defendant insurer would not be res judicala
on the question of fraud in subsequent proceedings brought by the insured against the
insurance company for additional installments. Nichols v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
84 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. flIed, (1936) 4 U. S. L WEEK 222.
8. Before loss a company may generally maintain suit in equity to cancel a policy
for fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Evslin, 101 N. J.
Eq. 527, 139 At. 520 (Ch. 1927). It is by no means clear, however, that equitable
relief may be obtained on other grounds. Compare Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,107 (C. C. D. Conn. 1879) with Brooking v. Maudslay,
Son & Field, 38 Ch. D. 636 (1888) (after loss).
9. Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Steinman, 103 N. J. Eq. 403, 143 Atl. 529 (Ch. 1928);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ptohides, 186 AtI. 386 (Pa. 1936). Equitable relief will not be
granted if insured has already brought suit on the policy or indicated that he will
do so during the contestable period. Stewart v. American Life Ins. Co., (C. C.A.
10th,.1936) 4 U. S. L. W=an 80.
10. See Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 96 Mass. 351, 352 (1867) ; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Steinman, 103 N. J. Eq. 403, 404, 143 At1. 529 (Ch. 1928). But see
Brooking v. Maudslay, Son & Field, 38 Ch. D. 636, 644 (1888). Bills to perpetuate
testimony would probably be available to prevent loss of evidence, [Ocean Ins. Co. v.
Bigler, 72 Me. 469 (1881)] but resort to that action would result in added expense
and a multiplicity of suits. Moreover it is more desirable to present the testimony first
hand to .those who must determine the questions of fact than to submit it through
depositions. See First-Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Meredith, 60 P. (2d)
1023, 1025 (Cal. 1936).
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have granted declarations of invalidity after loss," and in one case such
a declaration was made before loss.12 A declaration at the behest of the in-
surer that the policy is void is dearly within the scope of the usual declara-
tory judgment statute, permitting the declaration, in appropriate circum-
stances, of "rights and other legal relations."1 3
On the other hand an insured, for most pressing practical reasons, 1 vil
often wish to ascertain whether a policy is in force before any loss has
occurred. He might also seek to have the policy declared void before loss
in order to recover premiums paid, or, after loss, sue to determine whether
the policy is valid before initiating costly litigation on other issues. In the
first two cases equitable decrees validating'5 or voiding'0 the policy might
be granted, while in the last a suit for damages would provide something
of a remedy. Appre6iating these procedural difficulties, some courts have,
on behalf of the insured, granted declarations as to the validity of policies
11. In re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office [1922] 2 Ch. 67; Royal
London Mutual Ins. Soc. v. Barrett (1928] Ch. 411; In re Arbitration Behween Samson
and Atlas Ins. Co., 28 N. Z. 1035 (1909); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Richmond,
107 Conn. 117, 119, 139 At. 702 (1927). Contra: Brooking v. Maudslay, Son & Field,
38 Ch. D. 636 (1888).
12. Cf. Honour v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc. [1900] 1 C. 852.
13. Bo cEmnD, DECLARo-AoRy Jumm&s= (1934) 74, 314 et .eq. Numerous declar-
ations have been made as to the petitioner's freedom from duty (privilege) and the
defendant's no-right. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co. [1915] 2 K. B. 536; Zenie
Bros. i-. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
14. E.g., to find out whether new insurance must be obtained; or, if for any
reason new insurance is unobtainable, to have the security of the enisting policy deter-
mined.
15. Day v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480 (1878); Indiana Life
Endowment Co. v. Carnithan, 62 Ind. App. 567, 109 N.E. 851 (1915) ; Cohen . New
York Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610 (1872); Meyer v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co.,
73 N.Y. 516 (1878); American Trust Co. v. Virginia Life Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 553,
92 S. E. 706 (1917); see Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 44, 43,'
166 N. E. 798, 800 (1929).
16. Green v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 159 Mo. App. 277, 140 S. W. 325 (1911);
Myler v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 Old. 293, 167 Pac. 601 (1917); Equitable
Life Ass. Soc- v. Maverick, 78 S. IV. 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904). Insured might also
recover premiums paid by bringing an action for money had and. received, setting up
the invalidity of the policy. McCann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 177 Mass. 220,
58 N. E. 1026 (1901); American Life Ins. Co. v. McAden, 109 Pa. 399, 1 At. 256
(1885).
17. Honetsky v. Russian Consol. Mut. Aid Soc., 114 N. J. L. 240, 176 AUt. 670
(Sup. Ct 1935); Seligman v. Eagle Insurance Co. [1917] 1 Ch. 519; Life Ins. Co.
of Australia v. Phillips, 36 C. L R. 60 (1925) ; cf. Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v. Great
Southern Life Ins. Co., 330 Mlo. 988, 52 S. W. (2d) 1 (1932) ; see Killian v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 44, 48, 166 N.E. 798, 800 (1929). But cf. Honour v. Equitable
Life Ass. Soc. [1900] 1 Ch. 852. The above cases include requests both for validating
and voiding policies.
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both before17 and after loss. 18 In one case where the insured had paid a
premium to an absconding agent, the policy was held valid. 10 In another
a policy has been declared void where the insurer fraudulently represented
to the plaintiff that he had an insurable interest in the life of the person
insured.20
Coverage. Even if a policy is valid, a dispute may arise as to whether a
particular loss falls within its terms. Typical controversies are whether
insured's death was accidental or, with respect to disability insurance, whether
insured is disabled. In these situations the insurer is often confronted with
problems similar to those arising where the validity of a policy is in ques-
tion. Adequate reserves for contingent liabilities must be maintained; ex-
pensive litigation upon many issues may be necessary for the determination
of a narrow one; and evidence may become unavailable if insured delays
bringing suit. Since none of tie traditional remedies are available to insur-
er,2 ' he must await the pleasure of the insured or beneficiary in initiating
an action. Motivated primarily by the threat of loss of evidence, insurance
companies have in several recent cases petitioned for declaratory relief. In
one case under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act an insurance com-
pany sought to disclaim liability, on an accident policy on the ground that
death was not accidental. The court, while conceding that an actual contro-
versy existed, refused to grant a declaration on the theory that the statutory
provision for the declaration of "rights and other legal relations" could be
invoked only when the rights involved were those of the petitioner.22 It is
clear, however, that the act was couched in Hohfeldian terminology, so that
"duties" and "no-rights" wer6 intended to be as fihuch the subject of declara-
tion as their respective correlatives, "rights" and "privileges". 23 Since, more-
over, declarations as to petitioner's "duties" are not uncommon,24 it hardly
seems likely that this error will be perpetuated, although another federal
court, in a case where insurer had denied insured's disability and its own
duty to pay benefits, has similarly misinterpreted the act. While refusing
18. Condogianis v. Guardian Ass. Co. [19211 2 A. C. 125 (P. C.); Bradbury v.
London Guarantee & Accident Co., 40 C. L. R. 127 (1927); Saunders v. Queensland
Ins. Co., 45 C.L.R. 557 (1931).
19. Frasch v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 213 Cal. 219, 2 P. (2d) 147
(1931) (before loss).
20. Tofts v. Pearl Life Assurance Co. [1915] 1 I.B. 189 (C. A.).
21. See note 7 mfpra.
22. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (W. D. Mo. 1936),
criticized in Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
See also, Borchard, Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief (1936) 10 Ta.sp. L. Q.
233, 242.
23. Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on; Jidiciary oa H. R. 56J3,
70th Cong. 1st Sess. (1928) 43 (testimony of Professor Borchard); Borchard, The
Federal Declaratory Judgments Act (1934) 21 VA. L. Rpv. 35, 45; Borchard, supra
note 22 at 243; Legis. (1936) 49 HAiv. L. Rav. 1351, 1357 n. 41.
24. See note 13 supra.
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to grant a declaration on the insurer's "duty to pay", that court did determine
the issue of disability by granting a declaration as to the "right" of the
insurer to premiums, if the policy is to be kept in force, a claim normally
waived during disability.-5 Repeated refusals by the federal courts to make
declarations as to "duties" 26 would seriously restrict the utility of the declara-
tory judgment. An even greater error was committed by a circuit court of
appeals which refused, in a similar case, to issue any declaration at all, assert-
ing that there was no "actual controversy" between the parties, notwith-
standing the apparent presence of all the elements of justiciability.-" These
decisions cannot be justified on the ground that the insured's choice of forum
is restricted by granting the insurer a declaration, since the insured has ample
opportunity to choose his forum by initiating an action on the policy.
Although the insured is usually able to determine whether a loss is cov-
ered by bringing suit to recover on the policy, he frequently may be compelled
to try a lengthy and expensive suit in order to determine this one issue. It is
probably for this reason that declaratory judgments have been granted so
often to an insured seeking to determine the liability of the insurer.P But
a desire to avoid expensive litigation is by no means the only reason for
resort to declaratory relief in such cases. In some situations where an
attempt is made to determine the liability of the insurer the insured may
be either entirely without remedy or without a remedy immediately avail-
able. This is the situation under those indemnity policies where payment
of the judgment by the insured is a condition precedent to the insurer's duty
to indemnify. 9 If the insured is unable to fulfill this condition precedent,
the judgment Will hang over his head as a qontinuing liability always collect-
25. New York Life Ins. Co. v. London, 15 F. Supp. 536 (D. Mass. 1936), (1936)
36 CoL. L. Rnv. 1163. A declaratory judgment as to the insurer's right to premiums
in policies substantially similar except that no benefits were presently payable was
granted in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936).
26. Such declarations have been granted in insurance cases by other courts. See
note 11 vtpra. But see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bellos, ISS Tenn. 554, 55S, 13 S. NV. (2d)
795, 797 (1929), rehearing denied, 158 Tenn. 562, 14 S. IV. (2d) 961 (1929).
27. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 84 F. (2d) 695 (C. C.A. Sth, 1936), cert.
granted, N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1936, p. 54, coL 4, (1936) 36 Cor. L. RLTv. 1163; but
cf. Borchard, supra note 22 at 244.
28. Farrell v. South East Lancashire Ins. Co. [1933] Ir. R. 36; University of New
Zealand v. Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. [1916] N.Z. 509; Tucker v. South British
Ins. Co. [1916] N. Z. 1142 (whether disability clause covered inability to do "usual
work' or "any work"); Lichtenstein, Arnoldson & Co. v. South British Ins. Co. (1918]
N. Z. 353; Joyes v. National Ins. Co. of New Zealand [1932] N. . 802. Contra: Nesbitt
v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 Ad. 403 (1933).
29. Cases of this type will probably arise only infrequently in the future, since
most indemnity policies now impose upon insurer a duty to defend and where such a
duty is imposed the policy is usually held to be a policy of indemnity against liability
for damages and not a mere contract of indemnity against damages. Wfalley v. American
Indemnity Corp., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Ad. 571 (1929). For a discussion of cases arising
over the "duty to defend" see p. 294 infra.
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ible if he comes into funds. A declaration of the insurer's duty30 may enable
the insured to obtain a loan with which to perform the condition of paying
off the judgment, and in this manner avoid the impairment of his credit.
Also, where insured is threatened with suit, he may want to know whether,
if liable, he is protected by the policy.3 ' Still another situation is that in
which the policy provides for arbitration to determine the amount of loss;
for if the-type of loss is ultimately held not covered by the policy, the arbitra-
tion proceeding on the issue of the amount of loss is rendered useless.32 In
most of these situations, relief by declaration, deemed peculiarly appropriate
by the courts, has been readily granted
3
Disability Policies. When coverage is in issue under disability policies
the remedy of neither insurer nor insured is entirely satisfactory. When an
insurance company denies disability and refuses to make the payments
alleged to be due, the insured is limited in his recovery to those installments
which have accrued, and is able to recover subsequent installments only by
bringing suit after a default.3 4 A decree for specific performance would
probably not be granted since the legal remedy would be regarded as ade-
quate. 35 Even where anticipatory breach of such contracts is recognized, a
right to immediate damages is not a satisfactory remedy, because of. the
uncertainty as to the length of disability. The original purpose of the policy
would be better served by a judgment for accrued installments coupled with
a declaration of the insured's right to future installments, with the privilege
reserved to the insurance company of re-opening that judgment when it
maintains the disability has ended. While this procedure shifts the burden
of proof of disability to the insurer, it does not seem inequitable, since the
insured has already made a showing of actual disability and since the policy
contemplated uninterrupted payments during disability.3 0 Despite the obvious
advantages of declaratory relief, two American courts have refused declara-
30. Cf. cases cited note 51 infra. But cf. Piper v. Spence (1925] 1 D. L. R. (Manit.)
334.
31. Cf. Dobson v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 247 N.W.
789 (1933); but cf. Piper v. Spence [1925] 1 D. L. R. (Manit.) 334. See, also, dis-
cussion of,"duty to defend", p. 294 infra.
32. A declaration as to validity has been granted before arbitration was begun.
Western Australian Ins. Co. v. Dayton, 35 C. L. R. 355 (1924). Cases granting declara-
tions as to whether such arbitration is a condition precedent to recovery are cited in
note 51 infra.
33. See cases cited notes 30, 31 and 32 supra.
34. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U. S. 672 (1936), (1936) 46 YAL.-
L. J. 181; Puekett v. National Annuity Ass'n, 134 Mo. App. 501, 114 S.W. 1039 (1908) ;
notes (1932) 81 A.L.R. 379, (1935) 99 A.L.R. 1171. Costra: Federal Life Ins. Co.
v. Rascoe, 12 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 722 (1926).
35. Cf. Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
But see note 41 inlra.
36. (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 181, 184. But cf. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v.,Walker,
128 Okla. 75, 260 Pac. 1109 (1926).
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tions in such cases, one court basing its decision on the flimsy ground that
since it did not recognize any recovery for future installments, declaratory
relief would not be'granted,37 the second mistakenly assuming that an action
for a declaration could be brought only where no other remedy was avail-
able. 38 Such declarations 39 and similar ones,40 however, have been approved
and continuing judgments of this form, while not termed declaratory, have
been granted in several jurisdictions.4 '
In at least one situation under a disability policy the insurance company
is without an adequate remedy at law or equity. A disability policy is usually
an extra feature appended to' a life insurance policy and the insurance com-
pany normally agrees, in addition to making disability payments, to waive
premiums during the period of disability. The insured, claiming disability,
may neglect to pay premiums and at the same time assert that the policy is
in full force. He may refrain from bringing suit or even threatening to
bring suit for the disability payments. Under these facts the issue of dis-
ability will not be decided until many years later when suit is brought on
the life insurance policy and when the facts of the alleged disability may well
have become lost, blurred, and distorted by the passage of time. While a
declaration as to the duty of the insurer to make disability payments has been
refused in such cases, the issue of disability has been determined for the
purpose of declaring the "right" of the insurer to premiums.'
37.. BrLx v. Peoples Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 446, 41 P. (2d) 537 (1935),
reevg 29 P. (2d) 233 (1934).
38. Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. B. 33 (1932).
39. Bullas v. Empire Life Ins. Co. [1931] 4 D. L. R. (Ont.) 443 (denied on
merits); Brix v. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 P. (2d) 233 (1934), re-Yd, 2 Cal.
(2d) 446, 41 P. (2d) 537 (1935); see Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N. Y.
44, 48, 166 N.E. 798, 80O (1929).
40. BoRcHARD, DnccAAroa, Jxoiv0 urs (1934) 371-376; cf. United States v. Dis-
muke, 76 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 167 (1936), rchcaring denfcd,
297 U. S. 728 (1936); (1927) 27 CoL L. REv. 332.
41. Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S. NV. (2d) 493 (1933);
Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Goble, 254 Ky. 614, 72 S. IV. (2d) 35 (1934) ; Melancon
v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 176 La. 1055, 147 So. 346 (1933) ; cf. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Large, 230 Ala. 621, 162 So. 277 (1935) ; lVaterstrow v. National
Americans, 183 Ill. App. 82 (1913); Colburn v. Clover Leaf Casualty Co. 206 11. App.
327 (1917); .Southern Travelers' Ass'n v. Boyd, 1 S. IV. (2d) 446 (Te'. Civ. App.
1927), nodified, 12 S. NV. (2d) 133 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). Contra: Brotherhood
of Locomotive Fire. & Eng. v. Simmons, 190 Ark. 480, 79 S. IV. (2d) 419 (1935);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. English, 96 Te':. 263, 72 S. IV. 53 (1903); State Life Ins.
Co. v. Atkins, 9 S. W. (2d) 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); cf. Mid-Continent Life Ins.
Co. v. Walker, 128 Okla. 75, 260 Pac. 1109 (1926). Continuing judgments have bcome
customary in Kentucky. See note (1935) 99 A. L. R. 1171, 1177.
42. See note 25 supra. In determining whether to award declaratory judgments
in such cases the recent losses, in some measure due to "faked" claims, suffered by
insurance companies under disability policies, should be considered. See Ackerman,
Anticipatory Repudiation and Disability Insurance (1936) 1 U. oF N-matn L. RE,.
47, 48 n. 14.
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Duty to defend. Ascertaining whether a loss is within the coverage of a
policy becomes particularly important in indemnity policies, typically accident
liability policies, which usually impose upon the insurer a duty to defend all
actions covered by the policy. In the absence of such a determination both
parties are left between the horns of a dilemma. If it defends, the insurance
company may try an expensive fiegligence case in which a court may later
hold it is under no duty to pay. By refusing to defend, the company loses
all opportunity to dispute the injured party's right to recovery. The insured
his a similar unhappy choice of alternatives. The law offers no method,
other than the declaratory judgment, of deciding this narrow issue expedi-
tiously and alone. Recognizing this fact, several courts have granted declara-
tory relief to both insurer43 and insured.44 The difficulty of securing the
declaration before the damage suit is brought to trial might be overcome by
a rule of court giving preference to declarations in such cases. 5
Rights and privileges of insured. A dispute may arise as to the rights and
privileges of the insured other than his right to recovery on the policy. While
after loss a suit on the policy may be of some utility, before a loss occurs
there is no available method of determining such questions other than a
suit for a declaration of rights. Before loss the privilege of the insured to
set off the paid up value of his policy against his debt to the company, then in
liquidation ;46 the privilege of a trustee of a missing person to avail himself
of certain options provided for in the policy when the premiums were not
paid;47 and the right of plaintiff, seeking to be adjudged owner of a policy
on the life of his assignor, to the loan value of the policy,48 have been made
the subject of declarations sought against insurance companies. Similarly,
declarations requested after loss have put in issue the right to be paid in cer-
43. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1935); Com-
mercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. Tex. 1935); American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Central Garage, 86 N. H. 362, 169 Atl. 121 (1933); Merchants
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Pinnard, 183 Atl. 36 (N. H. 1936) ; Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glennie,
132 Misc. 899, 230 N.Y. Supp. 673 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Merchants Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Leone (Sup. Ct. Mass. Suff. County, 1936); Sun Indemnity Co. v. Triangle Furniture
Co. (Sup. Ct N. Y. Spec. Term Part III), opinion by Valente, J., in Record, p. 6, aff'd
without opinion, 289 N. Y. Supp. 821 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1936) ; cf. American Motor-
ists Ins. Co. v. Kopka, 186 Atl. 335 (N.H. 1936). But cf. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Savoy Grill, 51 Ohio App. 504, 1 N. E. (2d) 946 (1936):
44. Cf. Updike Inv. Co. v. Employers Liability Ass. Corp., 128 Neb. 295, 258 N. W.
470 (1935). But cf. Piper v. Spence [1925] 1 D. L. R. (Manit.) 334.
45. Several states make statutory provision for early hearing of declarations.
See, e.g., Ky. CoDES ANN. (Carroll 1932) Civ. Prac. §639a-3; Micnr. CoM p. LAvs
(1929) § 13904.
46. Paddy v. Clutton [1920] 2 Ch. 554.
47. Day v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. App. (2d) 681, 54 P. (2d) 502 (1936).
48. Morrison v. New York Life Ins. Co., N. Y. L. J. April 17, 1936, p. 1956, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term Part III).
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tain currency49 and the right to the full-proceed& of the policy where the
insurance company sought to apply a part to a mortgage debt for which the
policy was collateral security,50 and also have determined whether furnishing
rebuilding plans and leaving debris on the land pending arbitration were
conditions precedent to recovery upon a fire insurance policy.Y'
Change in by-laws. Similarly the rights and privileges of an insurance
company are often uncertain, particularly when important changes in general
policy are contemplated. A fraternal association may find it necessary to
revise its by-laws, increase assessments, reduce benefits, or adopt some other
course of action of doubtful validity under its by-laws or a state statute.
Before making the modifications the insurer would like to have their validity
determined against a contesting superintendent of insurance or policyholder,
rather than risk having far-reaching changes upset after they have been
effected. On the other hand, the insured may wish to challenge the legitimacy
of the revisions. The declaration provides a method for resolving such con-
troversies simplyO2 and has been resorted to frequently 3  One varning,
49. Anderson v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 42 T. L. . 123 (K. B. 1925); cf. Plum-
mer Hat Co. v. British Traders Ins. Co. [1932] N. Z. 576 (measure of loss of profits).
50. Douglas v. Mutual Life Ass. Co., 13 Alberta . . 13 (1913).
51. Young v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 29 N. Z. 50 (1909) ; United Ins. Co. v. Arthur
[1929] N. Z. 33 (whether arbitration as to amount of loss is condition precedent) ; cf.
Webb v. Queensland Ins. Co. (1920] N. Z. 11S (occurrence of conditions precedent).
Declarations have also been granted as to whether in policies of indemnity payment of
the judgment is a condition precedent to recovery. Malley v. American Indemnity
Corp., 297 Pa. 216, 146 At. 571 (1929) ; In re Law Guarantee Trust & Ace. Soc. [1914]
2 Ch. D. 617 (C. A.); cf. Post vz. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156,
237 N. Y. Supp. 64 (4th Dep't 1929), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 541, 173 N. M. 857 (1930). In-
sured might be able to raise the same issue by suing the insurer after judgment for the
amount of the loss. See Malley v. American Indemnity Corp., mrpra at 223,146 At. at 573.
52. Insured may challenge the validity of the changes by seeking to enjoin their
enforcement. Cf. Boyer v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 75 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
Insurer, however, can not initiate any proceeding other than the declaration to determine
the validity of the modifications.
53. By-law changes: United Order of Foresters v. Miller, 173 Wis. 299, 190 N. W.
197 (1922); cf. St. John's Baptist Soc. v. Ukranian Nat. Ass'n, 105 N. J. Eq. 69, 146
At. 886 (Ch. 1929); Buffalo Ass'n of Fire Undetwriters v. Noxsel-Dimick Co., 141
Misc. 333, 253 N. Y. Supp. 40 (1931). Reduced Benefis: Grainger v. Order of Canadian
Home Circles, 31 Ont. L. R. 461 (1914), aff'd, 33 Ont. .. R. 116 (1915); cf. Thiselton
v. Commercial Union Ass. Co. [1926] Ch. MS8 (increase in interest rates); Honetsky
v. Russian Consol. Mut. Aid Soc., 114 N. 3. L 240, 176 At. 670 (1935). Increased
Assessuents: Quinn v. Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n, 221 Ky. 750, 299
S. W. 989 (1927) ; Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees v. Dupriest, 235 Ky. 46, 29
S. NV. (2d) 599 (1930) ; cf. Snowden v. Masonic Life Ass'n of West. N. Y., 244 Ky.
286, 50 S. W. (2d) 569 (1932). Reductions in benefits and increases in assessments are
of course usually effected through changes in by-laws.
Similar matters, dealing -with important questions of general policy have been put in
issue by declarations, asked usually against administrative officers. Kenton & Campbell
Benev. Burial Ass'n v. Quinn, 244 Ky. 260, 50 S. W. (2d) 554 (1932) (validity of
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however, should be made. Care should be taken that all persons having a
substantial interest in the controversy be made parties at least by represen-
tation, since the courts will refuse to grant a declaration where it feels that
there has not been an adequate representation of opposing interests.54
Determining Beneficiary. Questions may arise concerning the rights of
parties other than the insured against the insurer. The typical situation is
that where there are several claimants to the proceeds of a policy. When
suit is brought against an insurer who admits liability but is uncertain as to
who is entitled to the proceeds, he can usually invoke the equitable remedy
of interpleader. While interpleader is adequate for many situations, par-
ticularly since the enactment of the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936,5 in
some cases it is circumscribed by technical restrictions. 0 Furthermore it
may be invoked only by the insurer and in this respect is a less supple and
direct remedy than the declaratory judgment, which is available both to
insurer and to claimants. Declarations have been granted to resolve conflicts
between vendor and purchaser, 7 executor and assignee,5 8 option-holder-lessee
and owner,5 0 rival beneficiaries under a surety bond,00 and others.01 A dec-
statute); Bank Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 120 Kans. 756, 244 Pac. 862 (1926)
(construction of statute); Australian Mut. Provident Soc. v. Attorney-General (1916]
N. Z. 179 (validity of proposed insurance policy); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public
Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 101 (confiscability of policies as enemy property); cf. General
Ins. Co. v. Ham, 57 P. (2d) 671 (Wyo. 1936).
In a recent case a declaration seeking to compel the superintendent of insurance
and a rating bureau to approve a form of policy plaintiff desired to take out was refused.
Riebs Co. v. Mortensen, 219 Wis. 393, 263 N. W. 169 (1935).
54. Continental Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cochrane, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. (2d) 308 (1931)
(duty to keep intact charter membership fees; policyholders not joined). But cf. North-
western Nat. Ins. Co. v. Freedy, 201 Wis. 51, 227 N. W. 952 (1929) (right of company
to organize a casualty insurance company; policyholders not joined); National Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 114 Kans. 456, 219 Pac. 261 (1923) (use of reserve fund for
building purposes; company president only defendant).
55. Pub. L. No. 422, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (Supp.
1936).
56. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (1921) 30 YAua L. J. 814; BORCHAnD,
DEcLARATORY JUDGIIENTS (1934) 72; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hyde, 148 Ore.
229, 242, 34 P. (2d) 930, 934 (1934), rehearing denied, 148 Ore. 229, 35 P. (2d) 980
(1934).
57. Brownell v. Board of Ed. of Saratoga Springs, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630
(1925) ; Scott v. Crinnian, 43 Ont. L. R. 430 (1918).
58. Royal Exchange Ass. v. Hope [1928] Ch. 179 (C. A.).
59. Schnee v. Elston, 299 Pa. 100, 149 AtI.. 108 (1930).
60. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hyde, 148 Ore. 229, 34 P. (2d) 930 (1934)
rehearing denied, 148 Ore. 229, 35 P. (2d) 980 (1934) ; cf. Mason's Adm'r v. Mason's
Guardian, 239 Ky. 208, 39 S. W. (2d) 211 (1931).
61. Royal Ins. Co. v. Mylius, 38 C. L. R. 477 (1926) (owner and protected mort-
gagee); London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fisher [1924] N. Z. 1286 (personal repre-
sentatives and receiver) ; cf. Ex Parte Hirsch's Committee, 245 Ky. 132, 53 S. W. (2d)
211 (1932) (committee for insane insured and corporate beneficiary).
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Jaration as to who was the beneficiary of a policy was granted to the insured
even before loss so that he might more wisely decide whether or not to dis-
continue payment of premiums.02
Sharing liability. Analogous to the beneficiary cases are those where the
dispute concerns the proportionate liability of several insurers of the same
loss. If recovery is granted against one insurance company, it may generally
bring an action for contribution against another insurer. Vhere the insurer
has a right to contribution, it has been permitted to assert that right in an
action for declaratory relief,0 either before or after judgment is entered
against it. The insured, similarly, may seek a declaration as to the respective
liability of several insurers. And while ordinarily an action at law against
each insurer would lie, the liability of one defendant sometimes depends
upon the determination of the liability of others. At least one court, recog-
nizing when liability is so interwoven that the matter may be disposed of in
an orderly fashion only in one proceeding, has granted a declaration.5
Insolvent inmred. A situation where a third person is vitally interested
in his rights against an insurer arises when an injured party finds that the
prospective defendant who is protected by insurance is insolvent.c The in-
surance company may claim that the particular loss is not covered by the
policy. Before trying an expensive negligence action against'the insured, the
injured party would of course like to determine whether the insurance com-
pany will be liable to the insured, for he seeks no Pyrrhic victory. A
declaration of insurer's liability prior to the trial of the negligence action
would appear an ideal remedy. Unless a statutory right of recovery is given
the injured party against the insurance company, 7 there may be some ques-
tion as to whether the plaintiff's interest in the policy is sufficient to support
his request for a declaration. The plaintiff's right to raise this issue is sup-
ported by the result in situations where the insured seeks a declaration against
the insurance company without making the claimant a party; there the court
refused the declaration on the ground that the claimant's interest was sub-
stantial enough to make him a necessary party.G0 And in one case where the
62. Cousins v. Sun Life Ass. Soc. [1933] Ch. 126 (C. A.).
63. Barnes v. Cushing, 168 N.Y. 542, 61 N. E. 902 (1901) ; Meigs v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 205 Pa. 378, 54 At. 1053 (1903); ViTucE, hisumzcc (2d ed. 1930)
78, 762. As to contribution in indemnity insurance when there are two different policy-
holders see (1935) 45 YAI.E L. J. 151.
64. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. American Surety Co., 313 Pa. 145, 169 At. 226 (1933);
cf. Johnson v. Mfortenson, 110 Conn. 221, 147 At. 705 (1929). But cf. Schmidt v. LaSalle
Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 576, 245 N. W. 702. (1932).
65. Lawrence v. American Surety Co., 263 Ifich. 5S6, 249 N. W. 3 (1933), re-
hearing denied, 264 Mich. 516, 250 N. V. 295 (1933).
66. While this section is phrased in terms of situations arising under accident liability
policies, the remarks made are equally applicable to other types of indemnity policies.
67. See, e.g., R. L GEzx. Laws (1923) § 1266.
68. Dobson v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 247 X. W. 7S9
(1933) ; Updike Inv. Co. v. Employers Liability Ass. Corp., 128 Neb. 295, 258 N. V.
470 (1935).
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iniured and claimant joined in seeking a declaration as to the liability of the
insurance company, the remedy was held to be available.69
Surety Bonds. Complicated disputes involving numerous parties arising
from surety bonds provide a particularly appropriate setting for the applica-
tion of declaratory relief. The case of A. E. Joy Co. v. New Ansterdam
Casualty CoY° furnishes an example in point. A subcontractor's bond pro-
vided that the contractor should be refunded money expended by reason of the
subcontractor's default. After such a default, two creditors of the subcon-
tractor filed liens, and the owner refused to pay the general contractor until
the liens were satisfied.- The contractor then sought a declaration against
the lienors, the subcontractor, the subcontractor's surety, and the owner to
determine the relations of the parties and the validity of the liens, and the
disputes were settled with a minimum of friction.
Conclusion. The recently increased case experience of the declaratory
judgment in the United States is rapidly giving the device a juristic content
of its own, different both from the anticipatory definitions of its proponents
and from its character in English and Dominion law. As one can see in the
insurance cases, limitations which will restrict its availability to cases satisfy-
ing certain structural criteria ard slowly taking shape. While it is still too
soon in the history of declaratory relief to reduce such limitations to formula,
they seem to be concerned mainly with two problems: how far need a con-
troversy proceed toward conflict between the parties before it is proper for
courts to grant declaratory relief ? And of what importance is it in deciding
on the availability of a declaratory judgment that other remedies are avail-
able in the particular case?
The cases which discuss the first question invoke the flexible formula that
the defendant must be acting in such a way as to affect prejudicially the rights
of the plaintiff. In applying this rule a tendency is discernible to refuse to
issue declarations in cases other than those of the kind traditionally decided,
despite the fact that the parties have asserted opposing claims in good faith
out of court.7 ' This trend is by no means universal, however, for many
courts regard the unfamiliarity of the situation and the consequent inability
of the plaintiff to avail himself of other remedies as making the declaration
ideally applicable.72
69. Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156, 237 N. Y. Supp. 64
(4th Dep't 1929), affd 254 N. Y. 541, 173 I. E. 857 (1930). But cf. Nesbitt v. Manu-
facturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 Atl. 403 (1933).
70. 98 Conn. 794, 120 AUt. 684 (1923). Other interesting surety cases where declar-
ations were requested are: I. Michaelyan, Inc. v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 229 App. Div. 123, 241 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1st Dep't 1930) " (validity of guarantee
of purchaser's note, declaration granted vendor); Hall v. United States Mat. Bank of
Omaha, 128 Neb. 254, 258 N. AV. 403 (1935) (declaration denied, necessary parties not
joined).
71. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Havorth, 84 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert.
granted, N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1936, p. 54, col. 4.
72. See e. g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ielmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936).
[Vol. 46: 286
